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The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and
vacancies revisited
Abstract
Recently, a number of authors have argued that the standard search model cannot generate the observed
business-cycle-frequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies, given shocks of a plausible
magnitude. We propose a new calibration strategy of the standard model that uses data on the cost of
vacancy creation and cyclicality of wages to identify the two key parameters - the value of nonmarket
activity and the bargaining weights. Our calibration implies that the model is consistent with the data.
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The Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) search and matching model (Christopher Pissarides 1985; 
Dale Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000) has become the standard theory of equi-
librium unemployment. It provides an appealing description of the labor market and has been 
found relevant in quantitative work. For example, Monika Merz (1995) and David Andolfatto 
(1996) have shown that the performance of the real business cycle model can be improved signif-
icantly when the MP model is embedded into it. However, Andolfatto (1996), James S. Costain 
and Michael Reiter (2005), and Robert Shimer (2005) have argued that the standard calibration 
of the model fails to account for the cyclical properties of its two central variables—unemploy-
ment and vacancies. These variables are much more volatile in US data than in the MP model.
The literature has responded by suggesting that the wage setting mechanism in the MP model 
has to be altered.1 We take a different route in this paper. We suggest that the problem lies not 
in the model itself, but in the way the model is typically calibrated. We consider the MP model 
to be a linear approximation of a richer model with heterogeneity and curvature in utility and 
technology. Consistent with this interpretation, we propose a new calibration strategy for the two 
central parameters of the MP model—the worker’s value of nonmarket activity and the worker’s 
bargaining power. Our calibration implies that the model is consistent with the cyclical volatility 
of unemployment and vacancies.
In the MP model, firms incur costs of posting a vacancy and recover these costs by paying 
 workers less than their marginal product. This gives rise to the period-by-period accounting 
 profits. Free entry ensures that expected economic profits from posting are zero. We measure the 
costs of posting vacancies in the data and find that they are small, implying small accounting 
profits in the calibrated model. This estimate uniquely pins down the worker’s value of non-
market activity conditional on a choice of the worker’s bargaining power. The choice of the 
worker’s bargaining power determines the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity in 
the model. Given the attention that has been devoted to the behavior of wages in this literature, 
we find it natural to explore a specification of the model that matches the elasticity of wages in 
1 Shimer (2004) and Roger E. A. Farmer and Andrew Hollenhorst (2006) suggest that some wage rigidity may 
be necessary. In Robert E. Hall (2005a) and Mark Gertler and Antonella Trigari (2006), a form of social wage norm 
renders wages not responsive to productivity changes. Hall and Paul R. Milgrom (2008) modify the bargaining game 
to limit the influence of labor market conditions on wages. Guido Menzio (2005) and John Kennan (2006) endogenize 
wage rigidity by modeling asymmetric information about productivity. Andreas Hornstein, Per Krusell, and Giovanni 
L. Violante (2005) and Eran Yashiv (2006) survey the recent literature.
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the data. The fact that wages are only moderately procyclical uniquely pins down the worker’s 
bargaining weight at a relatively low value, implying a value of nonmarket activity in the model 
that is considerably higher than the typical replacement ratio of unemployment insurance. Thus, 
low vacancy costs and moderately procyclical wages in the data imply that accounting profits 
are small and change significantly in percentage terms in response to small changes in pro-
ductivity. Consequently, firms’ incentives to post vacancies also respond strongly to changes in 
productivity.
Instead, the usual strategy is to choose the bargaining weight in a way that guarantees the 
efficiency of the model (i.e., to satisfy the Arthur Hosios (1990) condition) and to identify the 
return to nonmarket activity with receiving unemployment benefits. Our calibration implies that 
the return to nonmarket activity is substantially higher than the typical unemployment insurance 
replacement rate. This is the result one would expect in a frictionless competitive environment. 
For example, in a standard real business cycle model, market and nonmarket productivities are 
equalized: workers are indifferent between working one more hour at home or in the market (Jess 
Benhabib, Richard Rogerson, and Randall Wright 1991; Jeremy Greenwood and Zvi Hercowitz 
1991) and valuing equally market and nonmarket activities (Gary Hansen 1985: Rogerson 1988). 
Since the MP model can be considered a linear approximation to a nonlinear real business cycle 
(RBC) model, it seems reasonable to expect that it exhibits a similar relationship.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section I. In Section II we describe 
the importance of the values assigned to the return to nonmarket activity and bargaining power 
in determining the labor market volatility generated by the model. In Section III we describe our 
proposed calibration strategy, perform a quantitative analysis, and discuss our results. Section IV 
concludes.
I.  The Model
We consider a stochastic discrete time version of the Pissarides (1985, 2000) search and match-
ing model with aggregate uncertainty.
Workers and Firms.—There is a measure one of infinitely lived workers and a continuum 
of infinitely lived firms. Workers maximize their expected lifetime utility, E g`t50  d t yt , where 
yt represents income in period t and d [ 10, 12 is workers’ and firms’ common discount factor. 
Output per each unit of labor is denoted by pt. Labor productivity pt follows a first-order Markov 
process according to some distribution g 1 p9, p 2 5 Pr 1 pt11 # p9 Z pt 5 p 2 .
There is free entry of firms. Firms attract unemployed workers by posting a vacancy at the 
flow cost cp .2 Once matched, workers and firms separate exogenously with probability s per 
period (see Hall (2005b) for the evidence that s is constant over the business cycle). Employed 
workers are paid a wage wp , and firms make accounting profits of p 2 wp per worker each period 
in which they operate. Unemployed workers get flow utility z from leisure/nonmarket activity. 
Workers and firms split the surplus from a match according to the generalized Nash bargaining 
solution. The bargaining power of workers is b [ 10, 12 .
Matching.—Let ut denote the unemployment rate, nt 5 1 2 ut the employment rate, and vt the 
number of vacancies posted in period t. We refer to ut 5 vt /ut as the market tightness at time t. 
The number of new matches (starting to produce output at t 1 1) is given by a constant returns to 
scale matching function m 1ut , vt 2 # min 1ut , vt 2 . The probability of an unemployed worker being 
2 Throughout the paper, the notation X p indicates that a variable X is a function of the aggregate productivity level 
p, and Ep Xp9 is next period’s expected value of X, conditional on the current state p.
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matched with a vacancy next period equals f  1ut 2 5 m 1ut , vt 2 / ut 5 m 11, ut 2 . The probability of a 
vacancy being filled next period equals q 1ut 2 5 m 1ut , vt 2 / vt 5 m 11/ut , 12 5 f  1ut 2 / ut. The law of 
motion for employment is nt11 5 11 2 s 2 nt 1 m 1ut , vt 2 .
Equilibrium.—Denote the firm’s value of a job (a filled vacancy) by J, the firm’s value of an 
unfilled vacancy by V, the worker’s value of having a job by W, and the worker’s value of being 
unemployed by U. The following Bellman equations describe the model:3
 Jp 5 p 2 wp 1 d 11 2 s 2 Ep Jp9,
 Vp 5 2cp 1 dq 1up 2 Ep Jp9,
 Up 5 z 1 d 5 f  1up 2 EpWp9 1 11 2 f  1up 2 2EpUp96,
 Wp 5 wp 1 d 5 11 2 s 2 EpWp9 1 sEpUp96.
Free entry implies Vp 5 0 for all p and, therefore, cp 5 dq 1up 2 Ep Jp9 . Nash bargaining implies 
that a worker and a firm split the surplus sp 5 Jp 1 Wp 2 Up such that Jp 5 11 2 b 2 sp , Wp 2 Up 
5 b sp , and wages are given by wp 5 bp 1 11 2 b 2 z 1 cp b up .
II.  Business Cycle Properties
In this section, we calibrate all the parameters except for the value of nonmarket activity z and 
worker’s bargaining weight b, and explore how these two parameters affect the business cycle 
properties of the model.
A. preliminary calibration
We choose the model period to be one-twelfth of a quarter (< one week), which is lower 
than the frequency of the employment data we use, but necessary to deal with time aggrega-
tion. We aggregate the model appropriately when matching the targets obtained from the data 
with monthly, quarterly, or annual frequency. We set d 5 0.991/12. Shimer (2005) estimates the 
average monthly job finding rate from 1951 to 2003 to be 0.45 and, following Shimer (2005), we 
estimate the separation rate (not adjusted for time aggregation) to be 0.026. At weekly frequency, 
these estimates imply a job finding rate f 5 0.139, a job separation rate s 5 0.0081, and a steady-
state unemployment rate u 5 s / 1s 1 f  2 5 0.055.4
As in Shimer (2005), labor productivity, p, is measured in the data as seasonally adjusted quar-
terly real average output per person in the nonfarm business sector constructed by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS). We approximate, through a 35-state Markov chain, the continuous-valued 
AR(1) process log pt11 5 r log pt 1 et11 , where r [ 10, 12 and e , N 10, se2 2 . In the data we find 
(as do Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante 2005) an autocorrelation of 0.765 and an unconditional 
3 As in Shimer (2005), we implicitly assume that the value functions depend only on p and not on u. Existence of 
such an equilibrium is straightforward. Its uniqueness in the Pissarides (1985, 2000) model with aggregate uncertainty 
was proven in Mortensen and Éva Nagypál (2007).
4 The probability of not finding a job within a month is 0.55. The probability of not finding a job within a week then 
equals 0.551/4 5 0.861, and the probability of finding a job equals 1 2 0.861 5 0.139. The probability of observing 
someone not having a job who had a job one month ago equals (counting paths in a probability tree): s 5 11 2 f  2 1  fs 1 11 2 f  22 2 1 f  1s 11 2 f  2 1 11 2 s 2 s 2 6 1 11 2 s 2 5s 1 fs 1 11 2 f  22 2 1 11 2 s 2 1s 11 2 f  2 1 11 2 s 2 s 2 6 5 0.026. Solving 
for s, we obtain s 5 0.0081.
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standard deviation of 0.013 for the HP-filtered (Edward Prescott 1986) productivity process with 
a smoothing parameter of 1,600. At weekly frequency, this requires setting r 5 0.9895 and se 5 
0.0034 in the model. The mean of p is normalized to one.5
We need a matching function that ensures that the probability of finding a job and of filling a 
vacancy lies between 0 and 1. (Since the precise value of u will be meaningful in our approach 
to calibrating z below, we cannot conveniently normalize it as was done in Shimer (2005).) We 
follow Wouter den Haan, Garey Ramey, and Joel Watson (2000) (HRW) and choose m 1u, v 2 5 
u v / 1u l 1 v l 21/ l. We calibrate the value of the matching function parameter, l, to match the data 
on the average value for the job finding rate f 5 0.139.
B. the importance of b and z
Since the business cycle behavior of unemployment, vacancies, and the job finding probabil-
ity are deterministic functions of labor market tightness u, we can focus on the latter variable. 
In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) we derive, in the model without aggregate uncertainty, the 
elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity:
(1)  eu, p 5 
p
p 2 z  
bf 1u 2 1 11 2 d 11 2 s 2 2 /d
bf 1u 2 1 11 2 h 2 11 2 d 11 2 s 2 2 /d ,
 8
 k : 5
where h is the elasticity of f  1u 2 with respect to u. This expression shows that only changes in z, 
and not changes in b, have substantial effects on the volatility of market tightness and thus on 
the volatility of unemployment. Given the calibrated values for d, s, h, and f  1u 2 , k varies only 
between 1.03 and 2.20 for values of b between 0 and 1. The value of p / 1 p 2 z 2 varies between 
2.5 and 20 for values of z between 0.4 and 0.95. Thus eu, p is large only if p 2 z is sufficiently 
small. Equation (1) also confirms that the standard calibration strategy 2 z 5 0.4 and b satisfies 
the Hosios condition—leads to only small fluctuations in u. It also illustrates that setting z 5 
0.955 and b 5 0.052—the outcomes of the calibration strategy that we propose below—leads to 
large fluctuations in u.
These results, however, do not shed light on the economic mechanism behind equation (1). 
A prominent explanation of the findings in Shimer (2005) is that the elasticity of wages is too 
high in his model 1ew, p 5 0.9642 . The argument is then that an increase in productivity is largely 
absorbed by an increase in wages, leaving profits (and, thus, the incentives to post vacancies) 
little changed over the business cycle. This argument is not quite correct. Consider the experi-
ment of replicating Shimer (2005) with z 5 0.4 but choosing b to match the moderate productiv-
ity elasticity of wages in the data ew, p 5 0.449 (which will also be a target in our calibration). We 
find std 1u 2 5 0.02, which is essentially the same as in Shimer (2005) and is low relative to the 
data 1std 1u 2 5 0.2592 . This demonstrates that although the elasticity ew, p is now much lower, the 
volatility of market tightness does not rise precipitously.
In the second experiment, we set z 5 0.95, an outcome in our proposed calibration strategy, 
but pick b to generate the same high elasticity ew, p 5 0.964 as in Shimer (2005). We find that 
the volatility of market tightness is now close to what we find in our calibration (std 1u 2 5 0.302 . 
5 We have defined p as the marginal product of labor. In the data, we observe the average product of labor. We show 
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that this difference is inconsequential.
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This experiment shows that the model can generate a volatile labor market despite a high volatil-
ity of wages.
What explains these results? The correct argument is a subtle but crucial modification of the 
argument given above. The elasticity of wages does not matter per se. What matters for the incen-
tives to post vacancies is the size of the percentage changes of profits in response to changes in 
productivity. These percentage changes are large if the size of profits is small and the increase 
in productivity is not fully absorbed by an increase in wages. In the standard MP model, condi-
tional on the choice of z, the bargaining parameter b determines both the level and the volatility 
of wages. Thus, if we fix z and raise b, wages rise and become more cyclical, meaning that profits 
become smaller but less cyclical. These two opposing effects almost exactly cancel each other 
out. Thus, the volatility of labor market tightness is almost independent of b and is determined 
only by the level of z. In other words, the elasticity of wages is an important number, but only 
relative to the size of profits, which depends on z. However, while the value of b plays a minor 
role in determining labor market volatility, it is important for our calibration strategy because it 
helps to pin down z.
III.  Calibrating b and z
A. the problem of Linearity and Homogeneity
A strong assumption in the MP model is the absence of curvature: utility is linear, z is con-
stant, and the marginal product of labor moves one for one with average labor productivity. We 
view the MP model with these assumptions as an approximation of a richer model that incorpo-
rates curvature in aggregate productivity and in the utility derived from consumption and leisure, 
heterogeneity of preferences and workers’ productivity, home production, spousal labor supply, 
etc. This approximation seems appropriate to study business cycles since changes in aggregate 
productivity are relatively small and not permanent.
In such a nonlinear model without search, indivisibility of labor implies p 5 z in equilib-
rium (Hansen 1985; Rogerson 1988).6 Taking the view that the MP model approximates such a 
model (with search) constrains the choice of z. Indeed, for the MP model to be consistent with 
the nonlinear model, the value of nonmarket activity has to be very close to the value of market 
productivity. Even if the replacement rate of unemployment insurance is as low as 20 percent, 
z would be close to productivity in the equilibrium of the nonlinear model and thus has to be 
close to productivity in the equilibrium of the MP model as well. The reason is that households 
adjust leisure, home production, self-employment, disutility of work, etc.—activities that are all 
included in z—such that in equilibrium z turns out to be close to p.7 Thus, if one views the MP 
model as such an approximation, it would be unwise to identify z as the value of unemployment 
benefits only. This view also limits the possibility to study the effects of unemployment insur-
ance on the labor market across countries. Since leisure, home production, etc., adjust to changes 
in unemployment insurance, z is largely invariant with respect to changes in the replacement 
rate. As a result, even large differences in the generosity of unemployment insurance across 
6 Consider a family of measure one. The family decides what fraction of its members, L, should work in the market, 
given that each worker can produce z at home, to maxL 5Lp 1 11 2 L2 z6, where p 5 FL 1L, k2 denotes the marginal 
product of labor. Assuming an interior solution, the optimal choice of L implies p 5 z.
7 Hall (2006) uses empirical results from the labor supply and consumption literature at the household level to obtain 
a value of leisure relative to productivity of about 43 percent. Adding a conservative estimate of unemployment insur-
ance replacement rate of 0.3 already results in a value of z 5 0.73. Note, however, that the replacement rate is linked to 
a worker’s productivity in his previous job, which can be, due to the loss of specific human capital, substantially higher 
than his expected productivity in his next job.
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countries do not translate into large differences in z, and thus in unemployment rates. A value of 
z < 0.4, typically used in the literature, would also be inconsistent along another labor market 
dimension. The large and strongly procyclical flows from out-of-the-labor-force into employment 
can be rationalized only if the value of not working is close to the value of working for these 
individuals.
B. proposed calibration strategy
Two parameters remain to be determined: the value of nonmarket activity, z, and worker’s 
bargaining weight, b. Thus, we need two targets to identify them. To obtain the first target, we 
provide a measure of the vacancy posting costs in the data. This estimate uniquely pins down 
z conditional on a choice of b. The choice of b determines the elasticity of wages with respect 
to productivity in the model. We explore a specification of the model that matches this target. It 
turns out that such a specification generates the cyclical properties of the labor market variables 
that are consistent with the data. Moreover, it implies a value of b that is consistent with the 
cross-sectional evidence.
cyclicality of Wages.—We estimate the cyclicality of wages (measured as labor share times 
labor productivity) from BLS data (1951:I–2004:IV). We find that a 1 percentage point increase 
in labor productivity is associated with a 0.449 percentage point increase in real wages. Both 
time series are in logs and HP-detrended with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. The correspond-
ing estimate in the model is one of our calibration targets.8
Labor Market tightness.—To measure the costs of posting vacancies, we need to know the 
average value of vacancies or, equivalently, the value of u. Shimer (2005) estimated the average 
monthly job finding rate, f, to be 0.45. HRW found a monthly job filling rate, q, of 0.71. Since u 5 
f / q , these numbers imply a value for u of 0.45/0.71 5 0.634, which we choose as our calibration 
target. This number accords well with the direct estimate of 0.539 obtained by Hall (2005a) from 
the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). As expected, this estimate is slightly 
lower than 0.634. JOLTS started in December 2000 and covers only a recession and a fraction of 
the expansion that had slower employment growth than usual. Moreover, some vacancies are not 
captured by JOLTS: we see firms hiring workers within a month without ever reporting having 
a vacancy to JOLTS.
capital cost of Vacancies and the interpretation of the productivity process.—To account 
for the capital costs of vacancy creation, we follow Pissarides (2000) and recognize the pres-
ence of capital in the model. Making the presence of capital explicit does not change any of 
the equations in the model and amounts to only a reinterpretation of the productivity process. 
In the deterministic version of the model, vacancies arise only because firms need to replace 
8 In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), we recalibrated the model targeting a wage cyclicality at the boundary of the 
95 percent confidence interval around ew, p 5  0.449 and found that the results are not sensitive to the choice of ew, p in 
the empirically plausible range. We also used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate wage cyclicality 
from individual data to minimize the selection bias due to the entry of low-wage workers into employment in booms 
and exit in recessions, and found very similar estimates. This bias is not important in the regression of wages on pro-
ductivity because both sides are similarly affected: if workers entering in a boom are, say, 10 percent less productive, 
their wages are also 10 percent lower. Finally, we show that the elasticity of wages in the calibrated model with respect 
to (un)employment rate and GNP, while not targeted, is consistent with the data.
A standard assumption of the MP model is that wages are renegotiated whenever the aggregate state of the economy 
changes. An alternative wage determination assumption might be that firms insure workers against aggregate income 
risk. In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), we discuss the evidence and find little empirical support for the latter view.
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exogenously separated workers. Thus, we assume that posting firms and operating firms rent the 
same amount of capital.9
Let k denote the aggregate capital stock. The number of active firms equals v 1 1 2 u; 1 2 u 
of them are operating and v are looking for a worker. Thus, the amount of operating capital 
equals k 11 2 u 2 / 1v 1 1 2 u 2 and the amount of idle capital equals kv / 1v 1 1 2 u 2 . The aggregate 
constant returns to scale production function is F 3k 11 2 u 2/ 1v 1 1 2 u 2 , A 11 2 u 2 4 , where A is 
labor-augmenting productivity. We define k : 5 k / 1A 1v 1 1 2 u 2 2 and f 1k 2 : 5 F 1k, 12 . Denote 
by k* the value of k that satisfies the equilibrium condition f 9 1k 2 5 1/d 2 1 1 d, where d is the 
depreciation rate.
We can now define labor productivity p : 5 A 1 f 1k*2 2 11/d 2 1 1 d 2k*2 . Assuming that firms 
can buy and sell capital in a competitive market, the wage bargain is not affected by the presence 
of capital. The only difference is that A, the exogenous productivity process, is multiplied with 
the constant f 1k*2 2 11/d 2 1 1 d 2k*. Thus, p is still an exogenous (productivity) process. The 
firm’s flow capital cost of posting a vacancy is A 11/d 2 1 1 d 2k*.
capital costs of posting Vacancies.—We derived above that the flow capital cost of posting 
vacancies equals 11/d 2 1 1 d 2 kA 5 Fk k / 1v 1 1 2 u 2 , where Fk denotes the derivative of F 
with respect to its first argument. Decompose
 
FKK




1 2 u 1 v  
F
1 2 u.
We now compute the steady-state values for all three factors. Typical estimates from the national 
accounts imply a capital income share Fkk /F 5 1/3. Since u 5 0.634 and u 5 0.055, the number 
of vacancies v 5 uu 5 0.03487. Thus, 11 2 u 2 / 11 2 u 1 v 2 5 0.9644.
In a search model, income and production shares of labor and capital do not coincide. This is 
because labor is paid below productivity to compensate firms for the costs of vacancy creation. 




FLA 11 2 u 2
F  5 1 2 
F K K  
1 2 u
v 1 1 2 u
F  5 1 2 
1
3   
1 2 u
1 2 u 1 v  5 1 2 0.321 5 0.679.
Thus, the steady-state capital flow cost of posting a vacancy c k equals 0.474, or 47.4 percent of 
the average weekly labor productivity.
Labor costs of posting Vacancies.—The second part of the cost of filling a vacancy is the 
opportunity cost of labor effort devoted to hiring activities. John M. Barron, Mark C. Berger, 
and Dan A. Black (1997) present the evidence. Using the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot 
Project survey of 5,700 employers, they find that, on average, employers spend 10.41 hours per 
offer and make 1.08 offers per hired worker. This implies a total of 11.24 hours spent on each 
hire. The corresponding numbers from the 1992 Small Business Administration survey of 3,600 
employers are 14.03, 1.14, and 15.99. Thus, the average costs of time spent hiring one worker are 
9 This assumption seems natural since the one-job-one-worker abstraction of the MP model precludes any realloca-
tion of vacant capital across workers within a firm. In addition, it may not even be in a firm’s interest to engage in such, 
presumably costly, reallocation given the high job-filling rate. To the extent that firms can rent (a fraction of) capital 
after a worker is found, our assumption provides an upper bound on the capital cost of vacancy creation and, thus, a 
lower bound on the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies in the model. See Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) for 
the sensitivity analysis.
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between 2.2 percent to 3.2 percent of quarterly hours. Adjusting, as in José I. Silva and Manuel 
Toledo (2007), for the possibility that hiring is done by supervisors who receive higher wages 
than a new hire, the average labor cost of hiring one worker is 3 percent to 4.5 percent of quar-
terly wages of a new hire. We choose the highest value of 4.5 percent as the benchmark because 
this generates the lowest volatility.10
Let W be aggregate weekly wages. Wages are 2/3 of national income, that is, W 5 2/3F. 
Quarterly wages then equal 8F. Expected labor cost of hiring equals 0.045 · 8F in the data and 
cW/q in the model. The probability of filling a vacancy q equals f  /u 5 0.219, and we have just 
found that F equals 11 2 u 2 / 0.679 5 1.39. Thus, the flow labor cost of posting a vacancy cW 
equals 0.110, or 11 percent of the average weekly labor productivity.
cyclicality of Vacancy posting costs.—We have computed the average capital and labor costs 
of hiring. These costs are not constant over the business cycle.
First, capital per worker is procyclical. As derived above, firms use A k* units of capital in state 
A, where k* solves f 9 1k 2 5 1/d 2 1 1 d. Let A– and p– denote the mean levels of A and p, respec-
tively. Then, the steady-state capital cost c k 5 11/d 2 1 1 d 2k A– and the capital cost in state A, c˜ k 
5 ck A / A
–
 . Thus, c˜ k 5 c k A /A
–
 5 c k p /  p– 5 c k p in state p 5 A 1 f 1k*2 2 11/d 2 1 1 d 2k* 2 since 
we have normalized p– 5 1.
Second, labor costs of hiring change over the business cycle according to cW p j. To determine 
j we assume that wages of those engaged in hiring are fluctuating as much over the business 
cycle as do wages of other workers. As discussed above, the regression coefficient of HP-filtered 
log wages on HP-filtered log productivity in the data is 0.449. Since the HP-filter is a linear 
operator, j 5 ew, p 5 0.449.11 Thus, the costs of posting a vacancy in state A, or equivalently p, 
equal cp 5 c 
k p 1 cW p0.449 5 0.474p 1 0.110p0.449.
Bargaining Weights and Value of Nonmarket Activity.—Finally, we choose the values for z 
and b to match the data on the average value for labor market tightness u 5 0.634 and the elas-
ticity of wages with respect to productivity ew, p 5 0.449. As described in Table 1, we are able to 
match the calibration targets exactly. Calibrated parameter values can be found in Table 2.
We find that z 5 0.955, which is consistent with our view of the model as a linear approxima-
tion of a model with curvature and heterogeneity. We also find a workers’ bargaining weight 
of 0.052. This number is remarkably close to the one identified in the cross-sectional data.12 
Moreover, we will show below that this estimate implies that the model is very close to the effi-
cient benchmark once we account for the level of taxes in the data.
C. implied Labor Market Volatilities
The statistics of interest, computed from US data, are presented in Table 3. Hornstein, Krussel, 
and Violante (2005) report similar numbers. Table 4 describes the results generated by the stan-
dard model calibrated using the proposed strategy: the model matches the key business cycle 
10 In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) we show that results are not very sensitive to this choice.
11 Linearity means Hp 1 log pj 2 5 jHp 1 log p 2 . HP-filtering an isoelastic time series does not affect the regression 
coefficient: regressions of Hp 1 log pj 2 on Hp 1 log p 2 and log pj on log p give the same coefficient j.
12 Several papers (e.g., Louis N. Christodes and Andrew J. Oswald 1992; David G. Blanchflower, Oswald, and Peter 
Sanfey 1996; Andrew K. G. Hildreth and Oswald 1997) found using cross-sectional US data that, controlling for out-
side labor market conditions, a 1 percentage point increase in rm’s protability leads to an increase in wages of < 0.05 
percent. This value is remarkably close to our finding of b 5 0.052. Since they control for our outside labor market con-
ditions, their estimate corresponds to b in our model and not to the wage elasticity. Note that the identification in those 
papers does not rely on the cyclical volatility of wages. (A higher estimate of < 0.2 percent was obtained by 
John A. Abowd and Thomas Lemieux (1993) in a sample of Canadian collective bargaining agreements.)
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facts quite well. The volatility of labor market tightness, unemployment, and vacancies is higher 
but close to the data.13
D. Analysis
the Values of b and z.—We first establish that, since our estimate of the vacancy posting costs 
implies small accounting profits in the calibrated model (2.255 percent of labor productivity on 
average), and wages are moderately procyclical in the data, the value of nonmarket activity, z, 
has to be close to the productivity level, p, and workers’ bargaining weight, b, has to be relatively 
small.
Without aggregate uncertainty, it holds that
 w 5 p 2 
11 2 b 2 11 2 d 11 2 s 2 2
1 2 d 11 2 s 2 1 d  f  1u 2b  1 p 2 z 2 ,
and
 P 5 p 2 w 5 
11 2 b 2 11 2 d 11 2 s 2 2
1 2 d 11 2 s 2 1 d  f  1u 2b  1 p 2 z 2 .
13 Table 4 reveals two well-known shortcomings of the MP model. The correlation of labor market tightness and pro-
ductivity is too high compared to the data, and vacancies are more persistent in the data. The findings in Shigeru Fujita 
and Ramey (2007) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007) suggest that these problems can be fixed without dampening 
of the volatility of market tightness in the model.
Table 1—Matching the Calibration Targets
Value
Target Data Model
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. productivity, ew, p, 0.449 0.449
Average job finding rate, f, 0.139 0.139
Average market tightness, u, 0.634 0.634
Note: The table describes the performance of the model in matching the calibration targets.
.
Table 2—Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Definition Value
z Value of nonmarket activity 0.955
b Workers’ bargaining power 0.052
l Matching parameter 0.407
c Cost of vacancy when p 5 1 0.584
d Discount rate 0.991/12
s Separation rate 0.0081
r Persistence of productivity process 0.9895
s2e Variance of innovations in productivity process 0.0034
Note: The table contains the calibrated parameter values in the benchmark calibration.
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11 2 b 2 11 2 d 11 2 s 2 2
1 2 d 11 2 s 2 1 d  f  1u 2b  1 1 p 2 z 2 db 11 2 b 2 11 2 d 11 2 s 2 211 2 d 11 2 s 2 1 d  f  1u 2b 2 2  '  f  1u 2'p .
Since 0  f 1u 2 / 0p is positive, 0w / 0p is small if 11 2 b 2 31 2 d 11 2 s 2 4 / 31 2 d 11 2 s 2 1 d  f 1u 2 b 4 
is large, i.e., when b is small. Accounting profits, on the other hand, are small only if 1 p 2 z 2 3 11 2 b 2 31 2 d 11 2 s 2 4 / 31 2 d 11 2 s 2 1 d  f 1u 2b 4 is small. Thus, p 2 z also has to be small. The 
explanation is easy. Small profits mean that p 2 w is small, and moderately procyclical wages 
mean that w 2 z is small.
Efficiency.—When evaluating the efficiency properties of the calibrated model, one cannot 
ignore taxes. Adding taxes to the model has two consequences. First, the Hosios (1990) condition 
ceases to imply efficiency. Second, with taxes, market activity provides much higher incremental 
value over nonmarket activity than our estimate of z appears to imply. However, as Hagedorn 
and Manovskii (2008) show, given our calibration strategy, all equations (free entry condition, 
solution for wages, etc.) are identical in the model with and without taxes. Thus, the presence 
of taxes does not affect the dynamics of the endogenous variables, such as market tightness and 
unemployment, and there is no need to recalibrate and recompute the model. Only the efficiency 
Table 3—Summary Statistics, Quarterly US Data, 1951:I to 2004:IV
u v v/u p
Standard deviation 0.125 0.139 0.259 0.013
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.870 0.904 0.896 0.765
u 1 20.919 20.977 20.302
Correlation matrix
v — 1 0.982 0.460
v/u — — 1 0.393
p — — — 1
Notes: Seasonally adjusted unemployment, u, is constructed by the BLS from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising index, v, is con-
structed by the Conference Board. Both u and v are quarterly averages of monthly series. 
Average labor productivity p is seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the 
nonfarm business sector, constructed by the BLS from the National Income and Product 
Accounts and the Current Employment Statistics. All variables are reported in logs as devia-
tions from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1,600.
Table 4—Results from the Calibrated Model
u v v/u p
Standard deviation 0.145 0.169 0.292 0.013
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.830 0.575 0.751 0.765
u 1 20.724 20.916 20.892
Correlation matrix
v — 1  0.940 0.904
v/u — — 1 0.967
p — — — 1
Notes: All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing 
parameter 1,600. Calibrated parameter vaues are described in Table 2.
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properties are affected, since taxes are taken into account in a decentralized economy but not in 
a planner’s solution.
Let tf  be the wage tax paid by the firm and tw be the wage tax paid by the worker, respectively. 
Set w˜  p 5 wp 11 2 tw2 and wˆ p 5 wp 11 1 tf 2 . Nash bargaining implies that 
 wˆ p 5 b p˜ 1 11 2 b 2 1 1 t f1 2 tw  z 1 cp b up ,
 w˜  p 5 b 
1 2 tw
1 1 t f
 p˜ 1 11 2 b 2 z 1 cp b  1 2 tw1 1 t f  up ,
 P 5 p˜ 2 wˆ p 5 11 2 b 2 p˜ 2 11 2 b 2 1 1 tf1 2 tw  z 2 cp b up ,
where p˜ is the after sales tax revenue/productivity. Using 1987 effective average tax rates pro-
vided in Enrique Mendoza, Assaf Razin, and Linda Tesar (1994), we set tf 5 0, tw 5 0.291 and 
p˜ 5 11 2 0.0512p.14 When we estimate z, we really estimate 11 1 tf  2 z / 11 2 tw2 . Our estimate 
for z is 0.955, but the true value of z is 0.677. Instead of normalizing p to 1, we really normalize  p˜  
to be 1. The implicit normalization on p is then p 5 1/0.949 5 1.054. Thus, p 2 z 5 0.375. This 
calculation implicitly assumes that unemployed workers do not pay a consumption tax on z. This 
would be true if z represented only the value of leisure. Under the alternative assumption that 
the consumption of z is fully taxed, consumption taxes do not create a wedge between the values 
of market and nonmarket activities. Therefore, we can ignore them and have  p˜ 5 p. In this case 
p 2 z 5 0.323.
Next, we show that the bargaining power that maximizes social welfare is lower than the 
unemployment elasticity of the matching function. The efficient levels of u’s are the solution to 
the following optimization problem:
 sWp 1u 2 5 max
u
 3zu 1 p 11 2 u 2 2 cuu 1 dEp sWp9 1s 1 11 2 s 2u 2 f  1u 2u 2 4 .




d f r 1u* 2  5 1 p 2 z 2 1 c au* 2  f 1u* 2f r 1u* 2 1 11 2 s 2f r 1u* 2 b .
For d 5 0.9992, s 5 0.0081, c 5 0.584, p 5 1.054, z 5 0.677, and l 5 0.407, we find u* 5 0.670. 
To solve for the bargaining power such that the efficient amount of vacancies is posted, we derive 
the equation that determines labor market tightness for a given bargaining power of a worker in 
a deterministic version of the model:
 
c
dq 1u* 2  2  11 2 s 2cq 1u* 2  5 11 2 b 2 ap˜ 2  1 1 tf1 2 tw zb 2 cbu*.
14 We take the level of taxes as given. Hagedorn (2007) studies optimal taxation in models with search frictions.
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The result is b 5 0.152. If the consumption of z is taxed as well, we would find u* 5 0.596, and 
the efficient b 5 0.056. This result means that the calibration strategy that we are proposing 
implies that the model is much closer to the efficient benchmark than what is implied by the 
standard calibration, which, paradoxically, is targeting efficiency.
IV.  Conclusion
We have proposed a new way to calibrate the parameters of the Mortensen-Pissarides model 
and found that a reasonably calibrated model is consistent with the key business cycle facts. In 
particular, it generates volatilities of unemployment, vacancies, and labor market tightness that 
are very close to those in the data.
We find a relatively low value for workers’ bargaining weight. Despite the low bargaining 
weight, workers’ bargaining position is not weak because outside opportunities have significant 
effects in a dynamic model. Thus, the low bargaining weight does not imply that wages are either 
substantially below the marginal product or that wages do not change with changes in productiv-
ity. We show that such a low bargaining weight is needed to restore efficiency in the MP model, 
once we account for the level of taxes observed in the data.
Our calibration also implies that the value of nonmarket activity is fairly close to market 
productivity.15 This is the result one would expect in a frictionless competitive environment. 
Furthermore, our estimate appears reasonable since z is a sum of the value of leisure, unem-
ployment benefits, home production, self-employment, disutility of work, etc. The finding that 
a typical unemployed worker does not suffer a large decline in utility has to be interpreted with 
some caution, however. We make a strong assumption that z does not depend on the length of the 
unemployment spell. In our calibration we (implicitly) estimate the average z of all unemployed. 
Since the job finding rate equals 45 percent per month on average, short-term unemployed make 
up the bulk of observations. Thus, our estimate of z represents the value of unemployment for the 
representative unemployed worker and is uninformative about the value of long-term unemploy-
ment, since it is a low probability event.
Costain and Reiter (2005) suggest that a high z implies that changes in unemployment insur-
ance would have counterfactually strong effects on unemployment.16 Unfortunately, the effects 
of changes in unemployment insurance are hard to measure in the data. One possibility is to use 
microeconomic studies, surveyed in Bruce Meyer (1995). However, these studies are informative 
about unemployed workers’ search incentives, but not about firms’ incentives to post vacancies. 
In a typical microeconomic study, a small fraction of the unemployed are given a bonus if they 
find a job fast. Consistent with the MP model, their expected duration of unemployment remains 
little changed. The reason is that firms’ vacancy posting decisions are virtually unaffected 
15 Note that the value of being unemployed is close to the value of working, both in our calibration and in Shimer 
(2005) where 1W 2 U2  / W < 0.003. In addition, our finding does not rule out that becoming unemployed can cause 
noticeable distress for some displaced workers, as found in Louis S. Jacobsen, Robert J. LaLonde, and Daniel G. 
Sullivan (1993). This distress is caused not by the search frictions of the MP model but, more likely, by the loss of 
the worker’s union status or the loss in the value of the worker’s occupation-specific human capital (see Gueorgui 
Kambourov and Manovskii 2008). In other words, in a world with worker heterogeneity, there may be individuals 
with p much higher than z, whose p declines substantially upon displacement. Given that our model does not consider 
heterogeneity in p values, it does not speak to this issue.
16 Any model where shocks to productivity are strongly amplified is likely to exhibit strong effects of policies as 
well. The argument is simple. Any sequence of productivity shocks can be replicated through a sequence of sales taxes. 
In a basic RBC model, productivity and tax changes have identical effects both on first-order conditions and on house-
holds’ budget constraint—the conditions that characterize the equilibrium.
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because matching is random and expected profits do not change when a small fraction of the 
unemployed has a higher z.17
Whereas using the linear MP model seems appropriate for the analysis of business cycles, it 
may not be for other experiments, such as large and permanent changes in policy. For example, p 
5 FL is a process that moves with changes in technology, capital, and employment. The variation 
of employment and capital over the business cycle creates some curvature in p, which is absent 
in our analysis since we take p to be an exogenous process. This is fine for our purposes in this 
paper: what matters is how much p varies over the business cycle (measured in the data) and not 
whether technology, capital, or employment cause this movement. With curvature in labor in 
production, however, one cannot treat p as an exogenous process when studying the effects of 
changes in policy, especially if large changes in the employment level are considered.18
As another example, consider the response to an increase in unemployment benefits in a model 
where z is decreasing with the length of the unemployment spell. Firms would respond through 
posting fewer vacancies, which leads to an increase in the average duration of unemployment 
accompanied by a decline in the average z of the unemployment pool. This works against the 
direct effect of the policy and moves the economy closer to the equilibrium prior to the change 
in the policy.19
To study the effects of policies, it may be productive to embed the MP model into the RBC 
framework instead of resorting to a linear approximation. As Merz (1995) and Andalfatto (1996) 
have shown, this significantly improves the performance of the real business cycle model as 
well. An incomplete list of successes includes the findings that productivity leads total hours, 
unemployment, and vacancies are negatively correlated (Beveridge curve), and total hours and 
output fluctuate substantially more than wages. But the RBC model (with MP embedded and 
calibrated in the standard way) exhibits the same empirical shortcoming as the MP model itself. 
Unemployment and vacancies are not volatile enough. Applying our calibration strategy within 
an RBC framework resolves this problem.
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